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STAT

Peter Samuel

Dear Mr. Samuel:

This is in regard to your letter of 12 September 1985, addressed to Director Casey, regarding your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request concerning Wilfred Burchett. Your letter was referred to us for direct response to you.

Your request is awaiting review of responsive CIA-originated documents which had to be referred to other U.S. government agencies because some of the information contained in these documents originated with those agencies. Rather than wait for those documents to be returned, I plan to send to you other documents which have been reviewed for releasability. You will be receiving this release in the next few weeks. You should understand, however, that your request will remain open until such time as the other agencies complete their review of the documents referred to them. At that time we will advise you as to whether the referred documents can be released in response to your request. ←

Thank you for providing us your new address.

Sincerely,

John H. Wright
Information and Privacy Coordinator

STAT

ER

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA	X			
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO		X		
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS		X		
19	D/OIS		X		
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		SUSPENSE	24 Sep 85		

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Executive Secretary
16 Sept 85
Date

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Mr William Casey
Director CIA
Langley Va

September 12 85

Dear Mr Casey

Following the death of Wilfred Burchett in 1983, I filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for the release of CIA documents on this man. I think information your agency may have collected on his relationship with various communist governments would be of great news interest and political educational value.

My request has been treated with contempt by your Freedom of Information department. I did establish that my formal request was properly filed. Since then I have telephoned over twenty times enquiring about the status of the request. Most times I have been fobbed off with a promise to look at the files and call me back, and there has never been any call back or explanation.

I suppose I should be suing you in the great American tradition of litigiousness. I'm told under the law you have to respond and you clearly have not as an Agency.

I appeal to you personally to intervene. It may be of interest for me to note that the Australian Government has now released a lot of Burchett material, as has his family. See my enclosed Human Events article.

Yours

Peter Samuel



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PS It would be a privilege to meet you someday. F-102
my good friend [redacted] told me he met you.

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name operator in the recruitment to the Hanol line of such personalities as Jane Fonda, Noam Chomsky and Benjamin Spock. We do know that all three were prominent sponsors of his highly publicized and very political 60th birthday celebration. But his most important work was with journalists. He says in his own memoirs that he befriended CBS reporter Charles Collingwood, even managing to get himself employed for awhile as a special consultant with CBS. But he did best of all with the *New York Times*.

Burchett was the Vietnamese Communist authorities' handler of Western newsmen with the mission of manipulating them into echoing the party line. Some seem to have been mighty manipulable!

The private papers in Melbourne show that Burchett, in correspondence with his father and son in Australia, gloated about his successful use of *New York Times* correspondent Harrison Salisbury. He quoted a letter he received afterward from Salisbury as saying "I am deeply grateful to you for the aid and assistance..." while Salisbury visited North Vietnam.

His son speculated in a letter that Salisbury had thoroughly embraced the same points as Burchett, and Burchett replied: "Your suspicions were quite correct... but that is not a thing to talk about. The main thing is the result. As you said, Harrison said what I have been saying for a long time but it is more important that it is said in the *New York Times*."

Salisbury wrote a panegyric introduction for Burchett's memoirs published by, yes, *New York Times* Books in 1981 (*At the Barricades: Forty Years on the Cutting Edge of History*), saying of this Communist operative, he was an "individualist," a "humanist," an "iconoclast," one who "believes in the underdog," with "sympathies toward the cause of struggling, backward, emerging nationalist regimes."

In the *New York Times Review of Books*, Thomas Powers described Burchett as a man of "uncommon honesty." The *Times*, like other Western newspapers, regularly ran Burchett's writings, often identifying him merely as "an Australian journalist," sometimes calling him "left-wing," but usually treating him as an objective reporter and commentator.

After spending time on Burchett's personal papers in Melbourne and reviewing government documents, Prof. Manne writes: "To describe Burchett as an objective and honest reporter... is the equivalent of calling Julius Streicher a commentator on German-Jewish affairs."

He concludes: "In giving aid and comfort to the enemies of his country at time of war, Burchett was in the deepest sense of the word a traitor.... Burchett broke all ties of faith and community with his countrymen."

Saga of a Patriot

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

When Henry Hazlitt, Suzanne myself, as editors of a fortnightly, call *The Freeman*, were trying to find enough talented conservative writers for a first issue in October 1960, to find enough talented conservative writers to flesh out a respectable table of contents, we looked for names like Sokolskys and Moles of the time, a rather solemn crew. Looking for a splash of humor for our first issue, we thought of Morrie Ryskind, who was age 89 in his Arlington, Va., home.

Morrie, who had collaborated with Kaufman on several Broadway shows, the Pulitzer Prize-winning musical *Sing*, had gone to Hollywood. Though his name was indissolubly linked with the Marx Brothers, who were guaranteed attractions, he was, so Sue La Follette told me, having a hard time. He had testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities about Communist infiltration of Hollywood, which clearly marked him as someone as a premature anti-Communist.

Hollywood, as a result of the decision, had officially decided to clear this did not mean that those who had come back home with open arms, a blacklist covered obvious. Co-writers who had taken the 5th Avenue Hotel, Morrie Ryskind and his anti-Communist who included Ronald Reagan as a member of the Actors Guild, encountered their troubles.

Where the officially proscribed managed to get work under assumed names, who had testified against them, rough because of still smoldering, could have been called a white list, never admitted.

Sue La Follette's hunch that Morrie would come an outlet in *The Freeman* was Over the course of two years he did many pieces for us. (See his poem "Schlesinger, Jehovah's little messengers" of the pieces were parodies of King Room Ballads, with Truman, actors of dubious ethical reputation, the hanged Danny Deever and was taking the place of Fuzzy Wuzzy fighting man. When *The Freeman* existence as a fortnightly journal, Morrie moved on, with other *Freeman* Buckley's *National Review*.

Though I saw something of Morrie in New York and in visits to California, I never asked him if we helped bridge between his career as a playwright and his subsequent great success. But Morrie would have found an outlet. He never doubted that time was on the Communist side.

It must have pleased him great Reagan, after his election in 1980, to visit him in his Beverly Hills home.

Portray CIA as a Threat; KGB as Harmless**Australian Media Poison Relations with U.S.**

By PETER SAMUEL

Australia is an ally hardly uppermost in American thinking, but it is nevertheless of considerable importance to the United States. It is an island continent providing a home to U.S. military communications facilities deemed indispensable to the U.S. nuclear submarine force and to other receiving stations related to satellite early warning and monitoring of Soviet systems.

Australia has strategically important minerals and forms a natural fall-back position for U.S. basing for Pacific and Indian Ocean operations, should there be problems in the Philippines. Moreover, there are deep political roots in the U.S.-Australian relationship.

Both societies derive their values from the same philosophical pool and have developed similar political institutions. In Australia the alliance is deeply anchored in the idea of America as defender-of-last-resort, since the United States is credited there with having saved Australia from Japanese occupation in 1942, when Britain was unable to come to Australia's assistance.

Australian soldiers fought by the side of Americans, not only in the Pacific war against Japan, but in Korea and Vietnam. Australian governments, both conservative (called Liberal) and Labor, have been generally pro-American in their foreign and defense policies. The current Hawke Labor government continues a broad support for the Western alliance, although there has recently been some friction in relations between the two countries over Australia's increasingly neutralist nuclear arms diplomacy. This is associated with Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, sometimes more a rival than an ally of Prime Minister Robert Hawke.

Much more disturbing to supporters of the Western alliance in Australia is the more chronic problem of a steady slide in Australian public attitudes toward America, shaped in large part by a rampantly anti-American media there.

This virulent media anti-Americanism has many aspects. The quality of American life is constantly derided by a grotesque exaggeration of U.S. problems such as crime, drugs, race relations and poverty. U.S. national leadership is belittled by the caricature of President Reagan as a simpleminded old ex-actor, liable at any minute to plunge the world into nuclear holocaust by "shooting from the hip" in the White House, as he once did in his heyday in B-grade movies.

Third, there is a constant preoccupation with supposed CIA misdeeds in Australia, despite the lack of any firm



The greatest CIA "scare" in Australia followed a constitutional crisis in 1975 in which the Labor government of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (left) was dismissed by the governor-general. Incumbent Prime Minister Robert Hawke (right) was plagued by the "Combe Affair" during the first two years of his administration.



evidence of such, and the playing down of Soviet KGB activities. The greatest CIA scare in Australia followed a constitutional crisis in December 1975 in which the Labor government of Australia under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was dismissed by the governor-general, Sir John Kerr.

As national political correspondent for the Australian weekly news-magazine, *The Bulletin*, through the 1970s, I followed the affair and its aftermath at close hand, and always thought it was fully explained as an event in which the governor-general acted alone, on his own convictions of his constitutional responsibilities. (Whitlam was attempting to continue in government despite his inability to obtain a budget from an intransigent Senate). But the media gave constant credence to vague allegations, allusions and suggestions that the CIA was somehow involved in what was commonly described as a "coup" against the Whitlam Government.

These suggestions were based on the following skimpy facts. A senior CIA official in Canberra apparently rented a house owned by the deputy leader of the Australian Opposition. Fact two was that the CIA in Australia was upset immediately before his dismissal about Whitlam's use of this fact for partisan political point-scoring. Also introduced into the argument was the ancient history of the Australian governor-general's involvement during World War II, in intelligence activities, where undoubtedly he developed relations with U.S. intelligence.

More recently the rampant left-wingery of the big media in Australia has been evident in a sustained campaign to denigrate the Labor prime minister for acting to isolate a senior Canberra personality who was being recruited as a Soviet agent.

Known as "The Combe Affair," after David Combe (pronounced "Coom"), the Canberra lobbyist and Soviet agent in question, his isolation

by the government was treated by the Australian media as the major political issue for the country during much of the first two years of the Hawke Administration, 1983 through 1984. The fullest account of the media treatment of the Combe affair is by Robert Manne, a political science professor at Latrobe University, Melbourne, published in the October issue of the journal *Quadrant* (Australia's *Commentary* magazine, available at \$2.50 per issue, Box C344, Clarence Street, P.O., Sydney 2000, Australia).

The facts of the case were that the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), responsible for counter-intelligence, advised the Hawke Government that a prominent Canberra lobbyist, David Combe, was compromised by the KGB. Prime Minister Bob Hawke responded by requesting his Cabinet to keep Combe at arm's length, reducing his access as a lobbyist.

Combe was for seven years previous to becoming a lobbyist, national secretary of the Australian Labor party, and director of its national party office, a position equivalent to that of Frank Fahrenkopf in the Republican party. By dint of that close and long-standing party relationship with members of the government, he was before The Affair one of the Australian capital's best-placed lobbyists.

It quickly transpired that Combe had a very close relationship with the senior KGB officer in Canberra, Valeriy Ivanov, and in an inquiry into the affair (termed a Royal Commission) ASIO tape recordings of conversations between the two clearly established that the lobbyist was being recruited as a Soviet agent. He was being cultivated as a source of political intelligence and as an agent-of-influence, able to use his contacts and standing to more closely align Australian Labor party positions with Soviet policies.

It was also clear that the Soviets saw great potential in Ivanov as a channel

of influence to leading Australian journalists. Combe was a longtime leading "leaker" to journalists on Labor party affairs.

In one conversation with the KGB man Ivanov, Combe said he believed "very fervently in Soviet-Australian relations." He made trips to Moscow, received presents from the Russians and developed a close personal friendship with the KGB officer. Combe spoke to the Russians of establishing for himself a "liaison" role in relations between the Soviet Communist party (CPSU) and the ALP, and sought funding for this from a trading company that had monopoly rights from the Soviets in handling Australian-Soviet trade.

The Royal Commission concluded that Combe's collaboration with the Soviets had "serious implications for national security." It stated that Ivanov had received instructions from "the highest level" in Moscow to ask Combe to work for the Soviet Union. The KGB had in Combe an extremely promising target, said the Commission.

The offer of "trading" work was a "bait" in the recruitment process, it reported, and the KGB hoped "to use Combe to obtain and hand over... information and documents illegitimately, and in the interests of the Soviet Union to act, wittingly or unwittingly as an agent of influence."

Combe knew Ivanov was probably a KGB officer and all the same responded enthusiastically to Ivanov's recruitment proposal. He cooperated with the Soviet officer's suggestion that they meet "in such a way as to avoid surveillance" by the Australian security service.

The Commission, which was headed by an eminent and independent-minded judge, knowledgeable in intelligence matters, concluded in favor of Prime Minister Hawke on all major issues of the affair. The security organization had acted properly in investigating the affair and reporting to the prime minister and he in turn had acted properly in seeking to distance his government from the compromised lobbyist.

Political science Prof. Robert Manne in his *Quadrant* piece sums up the Australian media's treatment of the affair:

"Mr. Hawke's decision to ban ministerial [Cabinet level, in U.S. terms] access to Combe on grounds of his dealings with the KGB triggered a series of Pavlovian responses throughout the media.

"Outrage at what was seen as the McCarthyist treatment dealt out to Combe roused the passions of the journalists. The Hawke-ASIO-Hope concern with national security left them cold. ASIO was seen to be staffed by 'Cold War warriors' whose worldview (because it suspected the KGB was up to no good) was 'conspiratorial' and 'paranoiac.'

"The KGB was given the benefit of

Mr. Samuel is the Washington correspondent for Rupert Murdoch's Australian, a national daily newspaper. He freelances for various American publications, including *Defense Week*, *HUMAN EVENTS*, the *Washington Inquirer* and *Reason* magazine. In Australia he was national political correspondent for the weekly news-magazine *The Bulletin*, a columnist there and prior to that a leader-writer at the *Canberra Times*.

doubt and of ignorance. 'Cold War attitudes' toward the Soviet Union were, after all, impermissible. The KGB was not to be seen as the police arm of a totalitarian state. The word 'legitimate' attached itself more naturally to the KGB than the word 'sinister.' ASIO words like 'clandestine,' 'agent of influence,' 'recruitment' caused journalists to wince and snigger. . . .

The initial news of Prime Minister Hawke's instruction to his ministers to keep clear of lobbyist Combe was reported with extravagant indignation by almost all Australian journalists. Combe had been, in their words, destroyed, pilloried, traduced, liquidated, dynamited out of existence.

The supposedly conservative and up-market newspaper, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, editorialized that Combe's treatment had been "manifestly unfair." It was also a massive injustice and a monstrous injustice, other journalists wrote. On the taxpayer-financed, government-owned and Marxist-controlled Australian Broadcasting Commission, listeners were told that the KGB was just a "bureaucracy, made up of paper shufflers" and that the idea the KGB wanted to recruit agents-of-influence was a product of Cold War fantasy and propaganda.

In the beginning the Hawke government itself said little about the affair, which was fueled mainly by leaks from Combe himself. Combe was privately

informed of the charges and evidence against him, and an attempt was made by the government to keep the affair out of the news. But Combe took the offensive, leaking most of the news himself, to help him manipulate the way it was presented.

The media were at this stage intensely critical of the government for its secrecy. The government after a period of intense criticism and demands for the release of the evidence of Combe's wrongdoing, responded by putting out recordings of his conversations with the KGB officer, which was promptly denounced all round as a gross violation of Combe's right to privacy.

As Manne comments, the media were "hostile to the government on secrecy grounds when ASIO's evidence was not released and on civil liberties grounds when it was." Journalists played the classic double-faced game of tossing the coin while declaring "Heads I win, Tails you lose!"

Not a single Australian journalist penned a critical background article or comment on the KGB throughout the year-long Combe affair. Not a word on its record of espionage, forgery and disinformation, its historical role in providing the Soviet regime's executioners, bullyboys and torturers and its present role in promoting terrorism worldwide and crushing dissent within the USSR.

As Manne puts it: "In the Australian media the KGB appeared merely as a specter in the Cold War fantasies of ASIO."

The security intercepts showed that Combe promised the Soviets, documents on supposed CIA activities in Australia and in return asked the Soviets to cooperate in providing access to Soviet material on the CIA to jour-

nalists of the *National Times* (a pro-Soviet weekly newspaper published in Sydney).

Combe assured the KGB's Ivanov in one intercepted telephone call that the two *National Times* journalists, Editor Brian Toohey and staff writer Marian Wilkinson (currently Washington correspondent) "want to really nail the Americans" in a film they were making on CIA atrocities. Not a single Australian journalist questioned the propriety of seeking such Soviet favors, or of relying on the KGB for information on the U.S. government.

In coverage marked by an extraordinarily monolithic line of pro-Combe, anti-Hawke reportage, there were other glaring omissions, Manne records:

"No journalist questioned the propriety of Combe's recommending to a commercial company that it gain trade favors in Moscow by becoming involved in funding Soviet propaganda outfits or his own plans to work for the 'upscaling' (harmonizing) of relations between the CPSU and the ALP.

"No journalist enquired what authorization Combe had from the ALP leadership for his discussions in Moscow concerning the 'upscaling' of relations with the CPSU. No journalist noticed that Combe had . . . given [KGB Officer] Ivanov details of an [Australian government] report made confidential only to keep it from Soviet eyes."

Further, Manne points out that there was a big ignored story from the Commission that Ivanov told Combe his brief to approach him about so-called trade came not from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade but from Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the Soviet Central Committee, who is in charge of programs of penetration, influence and

active measures against the West. To have drawn attention to that link might have messed up the little story that Combe and the Soviets only had innocent "trade" and "good relations" in mind in working with Combe. Manne remarks that the Australian media would only have thought the ASIO interest in the Combe-Ivanov relationship justified if the Soviet officer had explicitly asked the Australian lobbyist to "spy" for them.

Manne expresses concern at the willingness of journalists "ostensibly reporting objectively, to campaign for Combe, to disguise from their publics what they were doing, and to strive consciously to shape public opinion on a question where issues of national security were concerned and where the reputations of the prime minister and of ASIO, as well as the reputation of Combe, were at stake."

The political scientist says the media mistreatment of the Combe Affair can only be understood as the latest chapter in a "long, complex and bitter struggle in Australia over attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union." It demonstrated the growing dominance in the Australian media of the formerly fringe leftist view of the U.S. as the major source of nastiness in the world.

In the Combe affair not only the leftist "push" in the media was campaigning on the side of the Soviet agent, but well-known centrists and free marketeers. Otherwise conservative organs of the media joined the regular mouthpieces of left-wingery to produce an extraordinarily harmonious symphony of pro-Combe and pro-Soviet propaganda.

Prime Minister Hawke was well justified in his comment that he had never before witnessed a more glaring case of unprofessionalism, bias and laziness from journalists.

Blacks Should Leave Democrats' Plantation

By SMITH HEMPSTONE

Blacks, the largest and most insoluble minority group in America, in November voted overwhelmingly against Ronald Reagan, the most popular President since Dwight D. Eisenhower.

What does that say about blacks, about black leaders, about the Republican party and about America?

The rejection by blacks of the party of Lincoln did not, of course, begin with Mr. Reagan. The avid and successful courting of blacks by the Democrats began back in 1932, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt first enunciated the politics of dependency which, when developed to its logical conclusion under Lyndon Johnson, left blacks virtually wards of the federal government. All that was missing were the tribal reservations and the peace treaties.

In the 53 years since Roosevelt ushered in a new era in American politics, only during the Eisenhower

period — eight years of national somnolence and golf — did blacks stray off the Democratic plantation in significant numbers.

In the seven presidential elections since Ike retired to his Gettysburg farm, the Republican candidate, no matter who he was or who he was running against, in war or peace, in boom or bust, polled no more than 16 per cent of the black vote.

In his landslide second-term victory, Mr. Reagan won the support of only 11 per cent of the blacks who bothered to vote (in a community of 28 million people, black registration for the 1984 election increased two million, to 12 million, but the black vote, with Jesse Jackson out of the race, did not increase significantly).

To a degree, black loyalty to the Democratic party has been a consequence of the style of Democratic presidential candidates. From Roosevelt through Walter Mondale, Democratic standard-bearers have gone out of their way to make it clear that they care about blacks and their problems (never

mind that their policies increased black dependency rather than fostering self-reliance). While blacks always have been welcome in the Republican party, this welcome has been pretty much on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

In short, by their continued adherence to the Democratic party, blacks have demonstrated convincingly that they perceive themselves as a group — as a minority with interests distinct from those of the rest of Americans — rather than as individuals. Entitlements became the name of the game, and whole generations of black leaders came to prominence with a vested interest in the welfare industry.

Over the years, Republican Presidents from Gen. Eisenhower to Gerald Ford showed a pronounced preference for dealing with (and, to a degree, rewarding) these traditional black leaders, the charismatic black preachers and welfare barons, rather

(Continued on page 12)



In 1983 Australian Intelligence established that lobbyist David Combe was being recruited as a Soviet agent by the KGB.